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Kehl: Criminal Procedure - Fifth and Sixth Amendment Protections - Brow
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - Fifth and Sixth Amendment Protections. Brown v.
State, 661 P.2d 1024 (Wyo. 1983).
John Thomas Brown Sr., was convicted in the District Court of Fremont County of manslaughter in connection with the death of Calvin
Yellowbear. He was sentenced to a term of five years in the Wyoming State
Penitentiary with the provision that he would be eligible for parole after
two years. Brown appealed his conviction on the ground that his sixth
amendment right to counsel had been violated. Specifically, Brown
asserted that during a pre-arrest custodial interrogation he requested to
have the assistance of counsel before being questioned further. Upon his request for counsel, he was released from custody. He was subsequently arrested and interrogated again, without counsel being made available. The
Wyoming Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to counsel
attaches only when adversarial judicial criminal proceedings against an accused have been commenced and the fact that Brown was only being questioned by officers investigating the death of Calvin Yellowbear did not trigger protection of the sixth amendment. On this basis, the Wyoming
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction.'
THE FACTS

On the morning of December 22, 1981, Brown and seven other member
of his family went on a hunting trip.2 Among the members of the hunting
party were Brown, his brother Andrew and his cousin Calvin Yellowbear. 3
Around sundown, a fight broke out between Andrew and Calvin
Yellowbear. When Brown attempted to break up the fight, a rifle4 discharged. The bullet struck Calvin Yellowbear who subsequently died.
The following morning Brown covered Calvin Yellowbear's corpse with
a blanket and left it in his pickup truck, which was then hidden. A two-day
period followed during which the body was not discovered. No report of the
shooting was made until the night of December 24, 1981, when Brown informed his father and his brother Charles that Calvin Yellowbear was dead.
During the early morning hours of Christmas Day, 1981, Brown and the
other members of the hunting party were picked up by the Ft. Washakie
5
Police Department and were taken to Lander, Wyoming, for interview.
The initial interview of Brown by officers investigating the death of
Calvin Yellowbear was conducted early in the morning of December 25,
1981. Prior to any questioning, Brown was advised of his constitutional
rights in accordance with the mandate of Miranda v. Arizona.6 At this
signed a document in which he waived his constitutional
time, Brown
7
rights.
Brown was then taken to Riverton, Wyoming, for a second interview
which began approximately two hours after the conclusion of the initial
1. Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024 (Wyo. 1983).
2. Id. at 1025.
3. Brief for Appelant at 3, Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024 (Wyo. 1983).
4. 661 P.2d at 1026.
5. Id. at 1026.
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. 661 P.2d at 1026.
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interview. Brown was not readvised of his constitutional rights, but he did
state that he still understood his rights.8
That afternoon, a third interview was conducted between investigating
officers and Brown. During the course of this interview, he expressed his
desire to consult with counsel prior to any further questioning. 9 He was
then allowed to leave the sheriff's office. 10
The next contact between Brown and the investigating officers occurred on December 27, 1981 during which Brown furnished a written exculpatory statement to the Fremont County Sheriff. This statement came
after he had been advised of his constitutional rights in accordance with
Mirandaand after he had signed another waiver of those rights." The next
day, December 28, 1981, Brown signed an affidavit in the office of the county and prosecuting attorney to the effect that Andrew Brown was
the only
12
person who had a gun in his hands at the time of the shooting.
Nevertheless, on January 19, 1982, Brown was arrested. He was again
advised of his rights in accordance with Miranda8 and was taken to the office of the Fremont County Attorney for further questioning. The county
attorney again advised him of his rights and then asked him whether he
wanted to make a statement. Brown finally
admitted accidentally firing the
14
shot which killed Calvin Yellowbear.
The principal contention made by Brown on appeal was that the interrogation on January 19, 1982, violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment
rights and that the subsequent admission of those statements into evidence
constituted error.' 5 The reasoning behind this theory was that since he indicated on December 25, 1981, that he desired to consult with an attorney
prior to talking further with investigating officers, and that he had not
subsequently waived his previously asserted right to counsel, the inculpatory statement made by him after his January 19 arrest was obtained
in violation of his right to counsel under the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.16
8. Id. at 1026-27.
9. Id. at 1027.
10. Brief for Appellee at 3, Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024 (Wyo. 1983).
11. 661 P.2d at 1026.
12. Id. at 1027.
13. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14. 661 P.2d at 1027. A pretrial hearing was held on a motion made on behalf of Thomas
Brown, Sr., to suppress all statements made to investigating officers on the grounds that
such statements were made while this defendant was under investigation for the death of
Calvin Yellowbear; were made without the presence of counsel after requesting the same,
involuntary, and without full knowledge of his rights against self-incrimination. The trial
court only suppressed the third statement of December 25, 1981, on the ground that
Thomas Brown, Sr., had requested counsel prior to making that statement. The trial
court refused to suppress any of the other statements, but leave was given to raise additional objections to the admissions of the inculpatory statement made on January 19,
1982. Id. at 1028.
15. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 9. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Supreme Court first
held that the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 355 (1963).
16. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 12-15. There were also additional errors claimed on
appeal; however, they are beyond the scope of this note.
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The state asserted two arguments against the error claimed by Brown
on appeal. First, the state argued that since Brown initiated voluntary contact with law enforcement authorities two days after he had asserted his
right to counsel he had waived his right to counsel as to any subsequent
statement. 17 Second, the state argued that Brown had "knowingly and
voluntarily waived his rights" on January 19, 1982.18

BROWN V. STATE

The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment right to
counsel attaches only when adversarial judicial criminal proceedings
against an accused have been commenced and that while it was clear in this
case that Brown had requested counsel during the course of the third interview on December 25, 1981, it was "equally clear that the right to counsel
prescribed in the [s]ixth [a]mendment had not then been attached."' 19 The
mere fact that Brown was being questioned by the officers investigating
the death of Calvin Yellowbear did not trigger the protection provided in
criminal proceedings had
the sixth amendment because adversarial judicial
20
not yet been commenced against the accused.
The use of the sixth amendment as a defensive tool is limited unless
that magic pre-requisite-the initiation of adversarial judicial criminal proceedings-has been met.2'1 As will be discussed below, the fifth
amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination is a more effective
method for developing a defense. 22 When deciding whether to use the fifth
amendment or sixth amendment, or perhaps both, the proper choice will
depend on the particular factual situation involved. The remainder of this
Note will focus on when the fifth or the sixth amendment should apply to a
given factual context. It should be noted at the outset that the two amendments are quite distinct, apply to different factual contexts, and are not interchangeable. Failure to assert the proper amendment on appeal may lead
to disastrous results for a client, as Brown demonstrates.
Background
In 1946, the Supreme Court in MaJoy v. Hogan recognized that the
fifth amendment's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination was a
fundamental right and, as such, was protected by the fourteenth amendment against abridgment by the states. 23 The landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona was announced in 1966.24 In that case, the Court dealt
17. Brief for Appellee, supra note 10, at 3-6.
18. Brief for Appellee, supra note 10, at 7-10. The state addressed other errors claimed by
appellant, however, these are beyond the scope of this note.
19. Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1029 (Wyo. 1983) (citing Moore v.Illinois, 434 U.S. 220
(1977); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)). See
Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156 (Wyo. 1983).
20. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 53-66.
21. See Kirby v. fllinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
22. U.S. CoNAST. amend. V, provides in part: "nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be
a witness against himself ......
23. 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424 (1971; Williams v. Florida, 389
U.S. 78 (1970); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
24. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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specifically with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual
who is subjected to custodial police interrogation. The Court also defined
the procedure necessary to insure that the individual is accorded his right
under the fifth amendment not to be compelled to incriminate himself. 25
The Miranda Court held that:
the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.2 6
Additionally, the Court stressed the importance of certain procedural
safeguards to inform accused persons of their right to remain silent and to
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise their rights. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has the right to remain silent,
that any statement he makes may be used against him at trial, and that he
has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or, if he cannot
afford one, an appointed attorney. 27 The defendant may waive these rights,
provided that the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently.2 8 If, however, he indicates in any manner or at any stage of
the process that he wishes to consult with counsel before speaking there
can be no further questioning. Likewise, if the individual is unaccompanied
by counsel and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the authorities may not question him. 29 The mere fact that he may
have answered some questions, or volunteered some statements on his
own, does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further questions until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. 30 Thus, these safeguards may be invoked at any
time prior to or during the interrogation. The primary purpose of these procedural safeguards is to dispel the aura of compulsion inherent in custodial
interrogation."' These procedural safeguards apply to a person suspected
as well as accused of a crime.8 2
Finally, the Supreme Court noted that the presence of counsel at the interrogation may serve several significant subsidiary functions. If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators the assistance of counsel can mitigate
the dangers of untrustworthiness inherent in custodial interrogation. With
counsel present the likelihood that the authorities will practice coercion is
reduced. The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement of the facts and that the statement is
reported accurately by the prosecution at trial.8 8
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 444-45.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 444-45. This position has been recently reaffirmed in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, r'eh'g denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981).

30. Id. at
31. Id. at
32. Id. at
33. Id. at

444-45.
458.
467.
470.
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Several years after the Mirandadecision was announced, the Supreme
Court was squarely presented with the question of whether an inadvertent
disregard of the procedural rules established in Miranda would result in34
the complete exclusion of any evidence obtained from the interrogation.
In Michiganv. Tucker, the Supreme Court seemed to retreat from the hard
line approach it had taken earlier in Miranda.5 The question specifically
presented in Tucker was whether the testimony of an alibi witness must be
excluded merely because the police had learned of the identity of the
witness by questioning the defendant at a time when he was in custody as a
suspect, but had not been advised that counsel would be appointed for him
if he was indigent.88 The Court held that the conduct of the police did not
abridge the defendant's constitutional privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, but only departed slightly from the prophylactic 3standards
7
laid down by the Court in Mirandato safeguard that privilege.
Several factors seem to have influenced the Court's decision. First, the
statement was not the result of any coercion and the statement was made
voluntarily.3 8 Second, the defendant was told that any statement he made
could be used against him and that he had the right to an attorney.3 9 Finally, the statement was not use against him at trial, but was merely used to
obtain a witness. 40 Thus, it seems arguable that the extent of the retreat
from the hard line approach of Miranda is proportional to the degree and
nature of the violation-the more minor the departure from the prophylactic standards of Miranda, the more likely that any error resulting
therefrom will not be considered prejudicial.
However, once a person in custody requests an attorney before being
interrogated or before being interrogated further, the police may not
disregard his request and proceed to interrogate him. 41 This is not merely a
minor violation of a prophylactic standard but rather it is more akin to a
direct infringement of the right against self-incrimination. Likewise, there
are certain requirements that must be met in order to show that a suspect
has waived a previously asserted right to have counsel present.
In Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court addressed those circumstances which indicate that an accused has waived a previously
asserted right to have counsel present during questioning. 42 In Edwards,
the suspect asserted his right to counsel and his right to remain silent, but
that the police, without furnishing him counsel or respecting his right to
34. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
85. Id.
36. Id. at 435. It should be noted that the interrogation took place before the Court's decision
in Miranda.
37. Id. at 445-46.
38. Id. at 444.
39. Id. at 444-45.
40. Id. at 437.
41. 384 U.S. at 444-45.
42. 451 U.S. 477 (1981), r'eh'g denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981). The issue presented to the Court
was whether the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments require suppression of a post
arrest confession which was obtained after Edwards had invoked his right to counsel
before further questioning. The Sixth Amendment issue was never reached, because the
case was decided on Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds as construed in Miranda.

Id. at 480-81, n.7.
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remain silent, returned the next day to question him further and as a result
of the second meeting secured incriminating oral admissions. 48 The Court
held that there was not a valid waiver of the previously asserted right to
have counsel present. 44
First, the Court noted that after initially being advised of his Miranda
rights, the accused may validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation. 45 Any waiver of counsel "must not only be voluntary, but must also
constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege," a matter which depends in each case upon the
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the
background, experience and conduct of the accused. 4"
However, additional safeguards are necessary when the accused has
previously asked for counsel and then purportedly waives that previously
asserted right. 47 Specifically, the Court in Edwards held that
when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be
established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his
rights.
[A]n accused.., having expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation
by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him,
unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, ex48
changes, or conversations with the police.
The issue of waiver becomes a two-step analysis. First, for there to be a
valid waiver, it must be the accused and not the law enforcement
authorities who re-initiates the contact. 4 9 Second, even if the accused initiated the contact, it must be shown that the waiver was voluntary and a
knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
or privilege. 0 Once a valid waiver is thus established, there is no constitutional prohibition against the prosecution using his subsequent statements
against him. 51 Thus, the Edwards Court reaffirmed that special protections
are required once an accused has52 asserted his desire to have an attorney
present before being questioned.
43. Id. at 479-80.
44. Id. at 482.
45. Id. at 484 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979)).
46. Id. at 482 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)).
47. Id. at 484.
48. Id. at 484-85. In Dryden v. State, 585 P.2d 483 (Wyo. 1975) the Supreme Court of Wyoming seemed to recognize the same principle enunciated in Edwards. In Dryden the court
noted: "the mandate of Miranda in this respect is clear and that defendant having indicated that he wanted an attorney, the county authorities could not thereafter enter into
other interrogation unless and until the defendant had himself reopened the subject." Id.
at 493. See Daniel v. State, 644 P.2d 172 (Wyo. 1982) for a similar analysis.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 483.
51. Id. at 484-85.
52. Id. at 485. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Sixth and FourteenthAmendment Challenge
The main thrust of Brown's argument on appeal was that his sixth and
fourteenth amendment rights were violated by the custodial interrogation
after his arrest on January 19, 1982. 53 In Kirby v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court noted that in a line of cases originating with Powell v. Alabama,54 it
has become firmly established that a person's sixth and fourteenth amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary
judicial criminal proceedings are initiated against him. 56 Thus, for sixth and
fourteenth amendment purposes, it is necessary to define when "adversary
judicial criminal proceedings" have been initiated. A defendant has the
right to appointed counsel "at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance before the justice through appeal." 56 In addition, the
United States Supreme Court has held5 7that the right to counsel attaches to
all critical stages in the proceedings. Over the years, the United States
Supreme Court has defined with some specificity what the phrase "critical
period of the proceedings," or more commonly "critical stage," has come
to mean. A critical stage of the proceedings has been held to include: arraignment,58 preliminary hearing,5 9 post-indictment lineup, 60 and at corporeal identification after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings. 61 In Kirby, the Court noted that critical stages involve points of
time at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal procharge, preliminary hearing, indictceedings-whether by way of formal
6 2
ment, information or arraignment.

The Supreme Court reasoned that the initiation of such proceedings
marks the commencement of the "criminal prosecution" to which the
guarantees of the sixth amendment are applicable. 6 The initial of criminal
proceedings is far from mere formalism. It is the starting point of the entire system of adversary criminal justice. At that point the government has
committed itself to prosecute and it is only then that the adverse positions
of the government and the defendant have solidified, and the defendant
finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and
64
immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.

The initial interview of Brown on December 25, 1981, was not a critical
stage of the proceedings, as defined by either the United States Supreme
Court or the Wyoming Supreme Court.6 5 At the time of the interview,
adversary judicial criminal proceedings within the meaning of Kirby had
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 9.
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
406 U.S. 682 (1972).
Wyo. R. CRM. P. 6(a).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). See Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1341 (Wyo. 1979).
287 U.S. at 47.
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).

60. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
61. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977). See also Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156 (Wyo.
1983) and Chavez v. State, 604 P.2d 1641 (Wyo. 1979).
62. 406 U.S. at 689.
63. Id.
64. Id.

65. Auclair v. State, 660 P.2d 1156 (Wyo. 1983). In Auclair, the Wyoming Supreme Court
seemed to adopt the same criteria defining "critical stage" as that stated by the Supreme
Court of the United States in Kirby v. Illinois. Id at 1160-61.
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not yet been initiated. Therefore, as the Wyoming Supreme Court held,
"the right to counsel prescribed in the Sixth Amendment had not then attached." Thus, there was no violation of Brown's sixth amendment rights
on January 19, 1982 when he made his inculpatory statement.66
From a defensive standpoint, it is clear that under facts similar to
Brown, a sixth and fourteenth amendment challenge to a denial of the right
to counsel is wholly inappropriate. However, by use of a fifth and fourteenth amendment challenge on appeal, the desired result could have been
achieved.
Fifth and FourteenthAmendment Challenge
The Miranda Court directly held that fifth and fourteenth amendment
prohibitions against compulsory self-incrimination applies to statements
obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation, 67 and this protection applies equally to persons suspected and accused
of crime. 68
In Brown, the initial inquiry should have focused on whether there was
a custodial interrogation on December 25, 1981, within the meaning of
Miranda.6 9 In Miranda, the Court defined custodial interrogation as
"questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." 7 0 And recently, in the case of Rhode Island v. Innis, the
United States Supreme Court took the opportunity to elaborate on the
definition of "custodial interrogation.' 1 In Innis, the Court held that the
Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to
say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
know are
72
suspect.
During the early morning hours of Christmas Day, 1981, John Brown
and the other members of the hunting party were "picked up" by the Ft.
Washakie Police Department and were subsequently taken into Lander,
Wyoming, for interview.7 3 Prior to any questioning, Brown was advised of
his rights under the Constitution in accordance with the dictate of Miranda. 7 4 During that day, Brown was questioned a total of three times. In the
course of the third round of questioning, he expressed a desire to consult
Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1029 (Wyo. 1983).
384 U.S. at 444.
Id. at 467.
The court in Mirandaheld that prior to any custodial interrogation a person must be afforded certain procedural safeguards in order to protect the person's fifth amendment
privilege. Thus, it would appear that a person's fifth amendment rights attach prior to, or
at the initiation of, questioning. 384 U.S. at 444.
70. Id.
71. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).

66.
67.
68.
69.

72. Id. at 300-301.
73. Brown v. State, 661 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Wyo. 1983).
74. Id.
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with counsel prior to being questioned further. 5 Under these circumstances it would appear that there was in fact a custodial interrogation
within the meaning of Miranda.The questioning was initiated by law enforcement officials after Brown was taken into custody. 76 Even the law enforcement officials conducting the questioning were aware that this was a
custodial interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. Before the first
round of questioning Brown was advised of his rights in accordance with
Miranda. Prior to the second round of questioning he was asked if he still
understood those rights, and, finally, was readvised of his rights before the
final round of questioning began.7 7 This questioning of Brown was more
than a general investigation into the facts surrounding the incident in
which the warnings are not required. 78 Rather, this questioning was the
79
custodial interrogation of a suspect in the shooting of Calvin Yellowbear.
Thus, all the procedural safeguards required by Miranda should have been
followed. When Brown requested the assistance of counsel before any furrights
ther interrogation, this was an invocation of his fifth amendment
80
under Miranda,and all interrogation should have ceased.
Once it has been determined that there was in fact a custodial interrogation under the Miranda standards, and the right to counsel had been
invoked, the next inquiry is whether there was a valid waiver of that right
to counsel under Edwards.81 In Edwards, the United States Supreme
Court noted that after initially being advised of his rights under Miranda,
an accused may validly waive his rights and respond to interrogation.
However, additional safeguards are necessary to protect the accused who
asks for counsel. 82 When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel
present during a custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot
be established by showing merely that the accused has responded to further
police-initiated custodial interrogation, even if he has been advised of his
rights. Once the right to counsel has been invoked, the accused is not subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him,
or unless the accused himself initiates further communication with the
authorities.8 8
In the recent case of Oregon v. Bradshaw, the United States Supreme
Court elaborated on the standards to be used in the test laid down in Edwards.84 In that case the Oregon Court of Appeals misapplied the Edwards
75. Id. at 1027.
76. When John Thomas Brown, Sr., was taken into Lander and advised of his rights in accordance with Miranda,it seems doubtful that he would have been free to leave at any time
at that point. This is especially true since at that time all members of the hunting party,
including John Thomas Brown, Sr., were probably all regarded as suspects in the
shooting. And as noted, Miranda does not distinguish between those accused or merely
suspected of a crime. See supra note 49. Thus, even if he was not technically "in
custody", at the very least he was deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way
under the meaning in Miranda
77. Id. at 1026.
78. In Miranda, the Court specifically excluded this type of investigation from its holding.
384 U.S. at 477.
79. For an example of what is not regarded as custodial interrogation within the meaning of
Miranda, see Beckwith v. U.S., 425 U.S. 341 (1976), and cases cited therein.
80. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1979).
81. 451 U.S. 477 (1981, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981).
82. Id. at 484-85.
83. Id.
84.

-

U.S.

-,

103 S.Ct. 2830 (1983).
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test by holding that the mere initiation of a conversation by an accused
would amount to a waiver of a previously invoked right to counsel.8 5 In
Bradshaw, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Edwards position that after
an accused has asserted his right to counsel, further interrogation of the accused should not take place unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges or conversations with the police.86 However,
the Bradshaw Court emphasized that the mere fact that a suspect initiates
further communication does not of itself constitute a waiver. Even where a
suspect initiates further conversation and where reinterrogation follows,
the burden remains upon the prosecution to show that "subsequent
events" constituted a waiver of the fifth amendment right to have counsel
present during the interrogation. 87 Thus, once an accused has invoked his
right to have counsel present during the interrogation the issue of waiver
of that right of counsel becomes a two step analysis. First, it must be
established that the accused, and not the authorities, initiated the conversation, communication, or exchange. Once this is established, there is no
violation of the Edwards rule. Second, it must be determined whether
there was a valid waiver of the right to counsel and silence. For a waiver to
be valid, it must have been knowing and intelligent, and found to be so
under the totality of the circumstances including the fact the accused and
not the police initiated further communication. 87 This determination
depends upon the "particular facts and circumstances surrounding the
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused."' 8
Under the particular factual background of the Brown case, Brown's
voluntary contact with the authorities on December 27, 1981, and again on
December 28, was an initiation of communication with the authorities
within the meaning of Edwards.89 This is especially true since his voluntary
contact with the authorities on both occasions was directly related to their
investigation of the death of Calvin Yellowbear. 90 Thus, since Brown initiated further communication with the authorities, there was no violation
of the Edwards rule on January 19, 1982.
The next inquiry is whether a valid waiver of Brown's fifth amendment
rights had occurred prior to the inculpatory statement of January 19, 1982.
There was some dispute in the evidence as to whether Brown was read his
85. Id. at 2834.
86. Id. at 2834-35.
87. Id. The Supreme Court has never defined what "subsequent events" will constitute a
waiver of the fifth amendment right to have counsel present during the interrogation. In
Edwards the Court emphasized the totality of the circumstances. However, as noted in
the text, the mere fact that the suspect initiates further communication is not of itself a
waiver. Therefore, under Edwards analysis, defining "subsequent events" becomes
critical. A subsequent events inquiry should focus on three factors. First, the amount of
time involved between initially advising a suspect of his rights and his request for an attorney and thereafter reinitiating communication. Second, whether prior to reinterrogation the suspect was advised that he did not have to speak to the authorities and that if he
decides to speak, the authorities may interrogate him. Finally, from the viewpoint of the
prosecution, it would well be worth the time to readvise the suspect of his rights and obtain a valid waiver of those rights prior to reinterrogation. This final step will provide
concrete evidence of a knowing and voluntary waiver.
88. Id. (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1979)) (quoting Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938)).
89. 661 P.2d at 1027 (1983).
90. Id
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rights prior to the January 19, 1982 statement and to whether the
signature on the "waiver of rights card" was his. 9' The record shows that
Brown could read and write and that he had an eighth grade education. He
had been given his rights before and during the investigation and had
asserted his right to counsel on December 25, 1981. A deputy sheriff
testified that he had read Brown his rights prior to questioning on January
19, 1982, and also testified that he witnessed Brown's signature on the
"waiver of rights card." It would appear that the trial court could have properly found that the waiver was knowing and intelligent under all the circumstances, including the fact that the accused, and not the police, initiated further communication. Therefore, the inculpatory statement made
by Brown on January 19, 1982, was not obtained in violation of his fifth
amendment rights.
CONCLUSION

The final outcome of the Broum case would have been based on fifth
amendment grounds as it was on the sixth amendment. However, a fifth
amendment challenge was the appropriate legal theory to assert in Browm.
As noted above, to invoke the fifth amendment, one only need show that
there was custodial interrogation and that the suspect invoked his rights
under the fifth amendment by requesting counsel. Under the sixth amendment, however, the right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings. Thus, under the fifth amendment,
a suspect may "invoke his rights" at an earlier stage than is possible under
the sixth amendment. In these circumstances, a fifth amendment challenge
92
is the appropriate legal theory to use in the preparation of a defense.
LARRY B. KEHL

91. Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 7; Brief of Appellee, supra note 10, at 8.
92. Thus, if Brown had not initiated subsequent contact on December 27 and 28,1981, and all
other facts remained the same, it seems probable that his inculpatory statements on
January 19, 1982, would have been inadmissible under Edwards. See also United States
v. Crowder, 691 F.2d 280 (6th Cir. 1982) where the Sixth Circuit noted that the assertion
of fifth amendment rights were still valid six months later. Id. at 283.
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